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A Tutorial on Mechanical
Decision-Making for Personnel and
Educational Selection
Rob R. Meijer1* , Marvin Neumann1, Bas T. Hemker2 and A. Susan M. Niessen1
1 Department of Psychometrics and Statistics, Faculty of Behavioral and Social Sciences, University of Groningen,
Groningen, Netherlands, 2 Department of Psychometrics and Research in Educational Measurement, Cito, Arnhem,
Netherlands
In decision-making, it is important not only to use the correct information but also
to combine information in an optimal way. There are robust research findings that a
mechanical combination of information for personnel and educational selection matches
or outperforms a holistic combination of information. However, practitioners and policy
makers seldom use mechanical combination for decision-making. One of the important
conditions for scientific results to be used in practice and to be part of policy-
making is that results are easily accessible. To increase the accessibility of mechanical
judgment prediction procedures, we (1) explain in detail how mechanical combination
procedures work, (2) provide examples to illustrate these procedures, and (3) discuss
some limitations of mechanical decision-making.
Keywords: mechanical prediction, clinical prediction, decision-making, educational selection, personnel
selection, prediction
Research does not win victories in the absence of committed policy advocates, savvy political work and
happy contingencies of time, place and funds (Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980).
[When it comes to prediction], the whole trick is to decide what variables to look at and then to know
how to add (Dawes and Corrigan, 1974).
Decision-making plays a crucial role in recruitment, selection, and hiring practices for jobs and
admission procedures for education. In making such decisions, much effort goes into selecting
the right predictors and collecting relevant information. However, the quality of the decisions
is dependent not only on the quality of the information but also very much on how the
information is combined.
There are robust empirical research findings that show that, when making decisions, it is better
to combine information (e.g., test scores, interview scores) according to some decision rule than
to combine data intuitively, or “in the mind” (e.g., Meehl, 1954; Grove and Meehl, 1996; Ganzach
et al., 2000; Grove et al., 2000; Aegisdóttir et al., 2006; Kuncel et al., 2013). A famous example of a
very simple successful mechanical decision rule is the Apgar score [see Kahneman (2011, p. 227), in
which a newborn gets a score (0, 1, or 2) on five dimensions: heart rate, respiration, reflex, muscle
tone, and color] instead of providing an intuitive judgment of the newborn. This latter form of
judgment is often referred to as “holistic” or “clinical” judgment, whereas combining information
based on a decision rule is described as “statistical,” “actuarial,” or “mechanical” judgment. Thus, for
example, when deciding which candidate to select for a job, better, more predictive judgments are
made when taking the sum of the (transformed) scores on, say, an intelligence test and the ratings
derived from a structured interview, than when combining these scores in an intuitive way, without
using an explicit rule (e.g., Dawes, 1979).
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In order to make accurate judgments, decision makers
need to use valid predictors and weigh information accurately
and consistently across cases (Karelaia and Hogarth, 2008).
Many studies have shown that decision makers have much
difficulty in consistently weighting information across persons
(Yu, 2018). Furthermore, people weigh cues inaccurately
(Dawes, 1979; Kausel et al., 2016) and tell themselves, or
others, coherent stories based on information that does
not have much predictive validity, like impressions from
unstructured interviews (Dana et al., 2013). Kahneman
and Klein (2009, p. 520) discussed that skilled intuitive
decision-making (similar to skilled holistic decision-making,
in our terminology) is based on recognition. To develop
recognition, we need “high-validity environments” and “an
opportunity to learn.” The problem with contexts like personnel
selection is that these conditions are not satisfied; even with
the best methods, future performance is far from perfectly
predictable, and explicit feedback is often absent, delayed,
and incomplete.
Thus, although there is overwhelming evidence (e.g., Kuncel
et al., 2013) that mechanical judgment, in general, yields equally
valid or more valid predictions and better decisions than
holistic judgment, decision makers and policy makers seldom use
these research findings. Many decision makers embrace holistic
judgment (e.g., Ryan and Sackett, 1987; Vrieze and Grove, 2009;
Silzer and Jeanneret, 2011). For example, colleges advertise that
they weigh factors like hardships and service to the community
holistically to get a more accurate and fair impression of a
candidate (Hartocollis, 2019).
Highhouse (2008) provided various explanations for the
reluctance to use mechanical rules in practice. One explanation
is that practitioners lack knowledge on the benefits of mechanical
over clinical judgment. Another explanation is that, on an
individual level, using mechanical combination procedures may
result in a lack of perceived autonomy and social interaction
people desire when they discuss candidate information and make
decisions. As Swets et al. (2000) discussed for diagnostic decision-
making: “[mechanical methods] are often met with resistance,
especially if they are seen as replacing or degrading clinicians.
Further, diagnosticians want to feel that they understand their own
diagnoses and recommendations and that they can give a narrative
of their thought processes.”
The underutilization of mechanical judgment by practitioners
and policy makers also illustrates the broader difficulties of
making practice and policies evidence-based. That is, to design
policies that are based on well-grounded scientific findings.
To stimulate evidence-based decision-making, it is important
to consider the conditions under which policy makers adopt
research findings. The British Academy (2008; cited in French,
2018) discussed that policy makers want research findings that
“(1) are relevant (2) timely (3) robust (with methodology
uncontested) (4) applicable to the issue of concern (5) are
accessible to a wider audience (6) bring together relevant
expertise from a number of disciplines (7) have champions and
advocates (8) involve the users of research in the research project
from the outset (co-production model) (9) support existing
ideologies and are uncontentious.”
When we evaluate mechanical decision-making against these
criteria, it is clear from the meta-analyses by Grove et al.
(2000), Kuncel et al. (2013), and Aegisdóttir et al. (2006)
that mechanical prediction is relevant, timely, robust, and
applicable to the issue of concern (criteria 1 through 3) and
has its advocates and champions in science (criterion 7).
Furthermore, it brings together expertise from disciplines like
psychology and statistics (criterion 6). Mechanical decision-
making is very relevant (criterion 4); however, it is not felt as
relevant because many practitioners do not have the impression
that their decisions are suboptimal. The challenge is to let
the larger audience experience the relevance of mechanical
decision-making. Another challenge is the accessibility of these
findings to a wider audience (criterion 5). Consequently, the
misunderstandings about mechanical decision-making may lead
to debates and may promote perceptions of dehumanization
(criterion 9). Finally, the lack of involving researchers from the
outset in a project (criterion 8) is an issue. Lilienfeld et al. (2013)
also discussed that there is a lack of papers that translate “findings
into non-technical ‘bottom-line’ conclusions that practitioners
can readily digest and use” (p. 897). Vrieze and Grove (2009)
conducted a survey under clinical psychologists to investigate
how many of them used mechanical decision-making. From the
logical inconsistencies in some of their answers, it can be deduced
that clinicians had difficulty in understanding what mechanical
decision-making exactly is, or how to apply it.
The aim of this paper is to illustrate the suboptimal
nature of holistic decision-making (criterion 4) and to increase
understanding of mechanical judgment procedures (criterion 5).
Therefore, in this paper, we (1) explain in detail how mechanical
judgment procedures work, (2) provide simple examples to
illustrate how these procedures can be designed, and (3) discuss
common objections and overlooked advantages. We also discuss
some limitations of mechanical procedures in practice that are
not often mentioned in the literature.
We fully recognize that lack of the accessibility of knowledge
and the existence of some misunderstanding around mechanical
procedures are not the sole explanations for the underutilization
of mechanical judgment (we return to this issue in the Discussion
section below). However, they are crucial for decision makers
to apply mechanical judgment procedures, and existing studies
do not provide explicit guidelines as detailed as we do in this
tutorial. We first discuss mechanical and holistic judgment and
then we provide an example how mechanical decision-making
can be implemented in selection procedures.
MECHANICAL VERSUS HOLISTIC
JUDGMENT
In a seminal book on mechanical versus holistic judgment,
Meehl (1954) synthesized research that showed that combining
information according to a rule instead of intuition results
in better predictions and decisions. In holistic judgment,
information from different sources is combined (in the mind)
to form a hypothesis about a candidate, and then based on this
hypothesis, “we arrive at a prediction what is going to happen”
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(Meehl, 1954, p. 4). Hence, the definition of holistic judgment is
not restricted to judgments that are based on “gut feelings” that
lack substantiation. Decision makers can and do often provide
an explanation of the reasoning behind their holistic judgments.
However, a substantiated judgment made “in the mind” is still
defined as a holistic judgment.
It is also very important to realize that the difference
between holistic and mechanical judgment is concerned with
the combination of information; it is not about what kind of
valid information is used. For example, interview scores can be
combined with test scores according to some mechanical rule,
although these interview scores may contain a subjective element.
Experts and specialists remain indispensable, but their primary
responsibility is to ensure that we choose valid information
to base judgments and decisions on Meehl (1956). The choice
of what information to include can be based on, for example,
knowledge of the scientific literature or valid local research
findings. Next, the information is combined on the basis of a
rule, not on the basis of professional experience, intuition, or
a “holistic” combination of information. Such rules can be very
complex or very simple, as we will illustrate below.
It appears to be very difficult for professionals to use
decision rules without being tempted to add information that
is not in the decision rule, or without altering mechanical
judgments (Eastwood et al., 2012; Dietvorst et al., 2018). This
is probably because in everyday decision-making (e.g., what to
have for breakfast), we also combine information and make
decisions holistically.
Hence, decision rules lead to better predictions, but for
practitioners, it is often not very straightforward how they can
be applied. Therefore, below we provide an extensive illustration
with examples of different simple rules. More complicated rules
can be used (for example, one may weigh each predictor with
the predictive validity obtained from a meta-analysis, or one
may optimize weights that meets organizational objectives, such
as hiring a certain number of women in the organization), but
here we restrict ourselves to simple rules that can be easily
applied in practice and that often perform equally well as more
complicated rules (Dawes, 1979; Dana and Dawes, 2004). We
provide examples for personnel and educational selection and
assessment procedures.
AN ILLUSTRATION: HOW TO DECIDE
WHICH CANDIDATE TO SELECT FOR A
JOB
We start with illustrating mechanical judgment in the context
of personnel selection, that is, the selection of a candidate for a
middle-management position. We distinguish different steps in
our procedure:
Step 1. Specify your criteria. Start with specifying the job
performance criteria; that is, what do you want to predict?
This may seem obvious, but it is often overlooked as an explicit
step. For example, do you want to predict how well candidates
will perform their future tasks, or do you also want to select a
friendly colleague?
Step 2. Choose your predictors. In this step, you decide
what information to collect in order to make the desired
predictions and how to collect that information. This may,
for example, include scores on psychological tests and ratings
based on structured interviews. In this step, it is important
that the information that is considered is valid. In practice,
you may have to rely on results from meta-analyses that
discuss how valid psychological tests, structured interviews,
or personality questionnaires are in high-stakes selection
contexts. However, you may also use local research findings,
given that this information is reliable and valid (correct
design, adequate sample size). Thus, information should
be included based on empirically established relations with
criterion scores, like future job performance. Note, again, that
a mechanical combination of information (predictors) does
not imply that “subjective” impressions cannot be considered:
the combination rule is mechanical, not the information
collection. However, the information should be quantified.
In the selection procedure for the middle-management
position, we use the score on a cognitive ability test, the score
on a conscientiousness scale from a personality inventory,
a score from a biodata scale, and a score based on a
structured interview1.
Step 3. Collect the information. This includes, for example,
administering tests, conducting interviews, and/or rating
resumes. The information is collected without making
judgments or decisions other than on the traits, skills, and
abilities that are assessed. A structured interview can be scored
by multiple interviewers. In that case, the interview ratings are
averaged into a final interview rating.
Step 4. Combine information according to a rule. We will
illustrate this below using a number of alternatives discussed
by Yu (2018) and Kuncel (2008): (1) equal weighting, (2)
weights obtained via experts, (3) holistic and mechanical
synthesis (Sawyer, 1966), and (4) limited expert judgment.
These methods are described below. One important condition
for combining the information is using the same scale for all
traits and skills that are assessed. This may be done through
standardizing the scores and ratings. However, if this is not
feasible, for example, due to a small number of candidates or
lack of a database containing scores and ratings of candidates,
a method such as presented in Figure 1 and to be discussed
below can be used2. Finally, compute the final scores and
decide who to select.
DIFFERENT WAYS TO COMBINE
INFORMATION
The most important advantage of using a rule is that it will result
in consistent weights for the different types of information. Using
1We chose these assessments for this example because they are often used (e.g.,
Morris et al., 2015). However, these assessments are not (always) the most suitable
assessments; this may depend on the position.
2This approach is suboptimal compared to using standard scores (with a mean of
zero and an SD of 1; see Bobko et al., 2007), and it reduces the variance of the
cognitive ability test scores, which reduces predictive validity.
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FIGURE 1 | Example of a joint candidate assessment form. The score on the cognitive ability test is rescaled to a score of 4 on a 5-point scale.
consistent weights will in most cases result in better decisions
than when information is combined holistically (Karelaia and
Hogarth, 2008; Yu, 2018). Let us illustrate the rules on the basis
of the assessment form depicted in Figure 1.
As discussed above, four types of information were collected:
(1) cognitive ability test scores, (2) conscientiousness scale scores,
(3) biodata scale scores, and (4) interview scores. To be able
to combine these scores in a simple and meaningful way, all
predictors were scored on or converted to a scale of 1–5. The
general formula to determine a “suitability score” equals:
Suitability score
= cognitive ability test score× (wca)+ conscientiousness score
× (wcs)+ biodata score× (wb)+ interview rating× (wi),
where the w’s are the weights that can be given to the different
scores and ratings.
When using statistical models such as regression models,
these weights are estimated based on a dataset that contains the
predictors and a criterion measure, such as job performance.
However, in practice, data to estimate optimal regression weights
are often not available. Therefore, researchers have investigated
whether simple solutions work as well as regression models,
or at least better than holistic judgment (Dawes, 1979; Bobko
et al., 2007; Kuncel, 2008; Dietvorst et al., 2018; Yu, 2018).
The conditions needed for these simple alternatives are that
each score or rating is positively related to the outcome we
want to predict and positively related to each other. We largely
followed Yu (2018), who discussed a number of alternatives
to regression-based weights when using mechanical rules. The
different approaches are ordered from simple to more complex
and – roughly – from most to least appropriate; the last two
approaches still need some holistic judgment or overruling the
results of the mechanical prediction. Such exceptions made
by human judges tend to reduce the quality of judgments
and predictions (Dawes, 1979). However, in general, all these
procedures should lead to better judgments and predictions as
compared to a full holistic judgment.
In Table 1, we provide the rescaled scores of five hypothetical
candidates on the four predictors and the scores for different
scoring rules, if applicable. We use these scores to illustrate the
use of the different decision rules.
Method 1: Equal Weighting
In this procedure, each predictor score is weighted equally and
gets a weight of 1. Thus, each score or rating is considered equally
important, and the suitability score (S) using this prediction rule
for candidate 1 (see Table 1) is, S = 4 + 5 + 3 + 3 = 15.
This simple rule can be applied for every candidate, and the
candidate with the highest mean score across the raters is
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TABLE 1 | Scores on different predictors for five candidates.
Assessment scores Final scores
Candidate Cognitive ability test Conscientiousness Biodata Interview Equal weights Expert weights Mechanical synthesis
Holistic rating Total score
1 4 5 3 3 15 22 3 18
2 3.5 2 3.5 4 13 20.5 3.5 16.5
3 2 3.5 2.5 3 11 16 3.5 14.5
4 4 4 3.5 2 13.5 19.5 2 15.5
5 5 5 4 3 17 25 2.5 19.5
selected. This method often works almost as well as regression-
based weighting, especially when the sample on which regression
analysis is conducted is not large (say, not larger than 200)
and when the optimal regression-based weights would not
differ much from each other (Bobko et al., 2007). However,
recently, Sackett et al. (2017) showed that when we apply
equal weighting and (1) there is one strong predictor (such as
intelligence test scores), (2) the other predictors have a relatively
weak relation with the criterion, and (3) the intercorrelations
between the predictors are relatively strong, adding a second or
third predictor may reduce the predictive validity as compared
to using only one best predictor. The reader may consult
Sackett et al. (2017), who provide a table with predictive
validity coefficients resulting from equally weighting different
combinations of information.
Method 2: Weights Provided by Experts
Decision makers may have reasons to consider particular
information about a candidate more important than other
information. For example, in our example of selecting a candidate
for a middle-management position, we can decide to give more
weight to the cognitive ability test score because research has
shown that these test scores have, in general, a strong relationship
with future job performance (Schmidt and Hunter, 1998).
Furthermore, we may give the structured interview rating more
weight because we used the interviews to assess valid information
about the skills and traits that are very relevant for this particular
job. If we weight the cognitive ability test score and the interview
rating twice as much as the conscientiousness score and the
biodata scale score, our rule equals:
Suitability score
= cognitive ability test score× (2)+ conscientiousness score
× (1)+ biodata score× (1)+ interview rating× (2).
For candidate 1, we get S = 4(×2) + 5 + 3 + 3(×2) = 22. We
can also observe in Table 1 that, although the highest scoring
candidate is the same as when all predictors were given equal
weights, the ordering of the candidates changed. In practice, this
approach tends to yield very similar results as when equal weights
are used (Bobko et al., 2007).
Method 3: Mechanical Synthesis
Under this rule, a decision maker first makes a holistic judgment
of the suitability of the candidate. However, this holistic judgment
is quantified on the same scale as the other information and is
made in addition to the other information that is collected.
In the example provided in Figure 1, an additional row would
be added for this overall holistic judgment, scored on a scale of 1–
5. This holistic rating is then added as an additional component
in the rule. For example, a decision maker may be moderately
impressed by candidate 1 and gives an overall rating of 3. If we
would give all components, including this rating, equal weights,
we obtain S = 4 + 5 + 3 + 3 + 3 = 18. In general, this procedure
does not result in better decisions compared to the procedures
described above, but it also does not result in reduced accuracy,
unless the holistic rating would receive a high weight (Sawyer,
1966). The advantage is that it increases the sense of control and
autonomy of decision makers (e.g., Nolan and Highhouse, 2014).
Method 4: Holistic Synthesis
Here, we start using a rule such as discussed in method 1
or 2, but after the scores have been calculated mechanically,
the decision maker is allowed to combine the mechanical
prediction with all other information holistically and may
change the final rating accordingly. This enhances the feeling
of autonomy. However, through the application of a rule
resulting in a total score, decision makers obtain “anchors” that
guide their judgments (Dietvorst et al., 2018). For example,
let us assume that we first apply equal weights, and then the
decision maker decides to add two points to the score of
candidate 1 because of a skill that was perceived as useful
but not explicitly assessed in the procedure. We hypothesize
that this method probably yields more acceptance and higher
use-intentions from decision makers compared to the “purer”
mechanical procedures described previously, but lower accuracy
as compared to pure mechanical rules without the possibility to
overrule the results.
Finally, when a large pool of candidates is available, Kuncel
(2008) proposed to first select candidates mechanically, and
then select the final candidates holistically. This should lead to
reasonably good results, because after the first mechanical hurdle,
it is likely that most candidates are good candidates. Therefore,
allowing the final hurdle to be holistic would not affect the
decision quality that much.
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COMMONLY RAISED OBJECTIONS AND
OFTEN OVERLOOKED ADVANTAGES
More Information Is Not Always Better
Many test and exam manuals warn against the over-
interpretation of test scores. For example, in a document
about the interpretation of Law School Admission Test (LSAT)
scores (see the Law School Admission Council, 2014), the authors
emphasize that “The LSAT is just one source of information
that should be considered when evaluating an applicant.”
Including more information may indeed be better, but only
when that information increases the predictive validity and
thus yields more accurate judgments and better decisions.
What is often overlooked is that more information does not
always lead to better prediction. When information is judged
holistically, adding information with suboptimal validity, such as
information from an unstructured interview, may even reduce
validity, because it dilutes valid information obtained from,
for example, grades or tests (Dana et al., 2013; Kausel et al.,
2016). In addition, reduced validity as a result of adding less
valid information to valid information can also occur when
suboptimal weights are used, as we discussed above (Sackett
et al., 2017). Therefore, it is advised to remove information that
has small predictive validity and would be given a small weight
from assessment procedures altogether (Wainer, 1978).
Reliability of Scores and Ratings
A question that arises in discussions about mechanical judgment
is how to take uncertainty and unreliability into account.
For example, The Standards for Educational and Psychological
testing (2014, p. 1) mentions that the standard error of
measurment (SEM) should always be reported, and the Law
School Admission Council (2014) states that the SEM should be
considered when comparing LSAT scores between candidates.
Admittedly, scores and ratings are not perfectly reliable, and
neither are the resulting total scores. For example, if we have
two candidates for one position whose “suitability scores” are
close together and whose confidence intervals overlap, what
should we do? When making decisions, it is often inevitable
that there will be persons with similar scores. In those cases,
considering candidates whose confidence intervals overlap as
similar is not an option because of the logical inconsistencies
that follow from this approach (see Campion et al., 2001).
Treating scores as interchangeable within a confidence interval
will result in the absurd situation that we cannot distinguish
any score within the whole range of test scores because “there
are large numbers of scores below the bottom of the interval
that are not statistically significantly different from most of the
scores that are in that [confidence interval]” (Campion et al.,
2001, p. 159).
Thus, how should we decide which candidate to select?
Admittedly, the predictions about future performance based
on the information we collect are probabilistic. However, the
decisions we make based on probabilistic information usually
are not; an applicant is either hired or rejected. Nevertheless,
the best option is still to pick the candidates with the
highest scores (possibly obtained across different predictors),
and to ignore information about reliability or stability of
scores in the part of the process in which decisions are
made based on the information that was collected. Remember
that a positive relationship between the measurements that
are used to select a candidate and job performance ensures
that higher scores will – on average – result in higher
job performance.
Reliability should, of course, be considered when choosing
what predictors to include in the decision-making process.
Wainer (2005, p. 112) provided a very pragmatic argument to
ignore stability of test scores when discussing admissions based
on School Admission Test scores:
“I certainly believe that the stability of scores (. . .) is important,
but in most cases neither the applicant nor the schools receiving
the scores care a lot about this information (other than the
understanding that such scores are stable enough for their intended
use). College admission tests are, to a very large extent, a contest.
The focus is on who did best on a particular day. Olympic gold
medals are not given out to the best athlete determined by averaging
a large number of performances over a year or two.”
Although one may argue that “applicants and schools should
care,” taking uncertainty into account when binary decisions
have to be made, such as accepting or rejecting a candidate, is
practically not possible.
Predicting Multiple Outcomes
In some cases, we may not want to predict one outcome,
but multiple outcomes that are not strongly related to each
other, such as task performance and turnover (Rubenstein
et al., 2018), or diversity and adverse impact reduction.
Indeed, predicting different outcomes may require different
information and different weights (e.g., Darr and Catano, 2016).
However, this does not mean that mechanical rules could not
be used in these cases. We could use a form such as in
Figure 1 for each outcome, and average the results across
candidates or set cutoff values for each, or we can use both
techniques. For example, as mentioned in the introduction
with respect to admission testing, some colleges may want to
take “hardship” and “service to the community” into account.
We hope we have made clear that they can do so without
having to use a holistic procedure. They can simply score
such variables and then add that information to other variables
they want to consider in a transparent way3. Another issue
is the assumption that higher scores and ratings translate
to higher job performance. However, if moderate scores are
desirable, it is possible to give higher scores for moderate
levels of a traits or skill in mechanical procedures, if that
would be warranted.
Transparency
An important advantage of mechanical decision-making is
that decision makers can be completely transparent about
3In some countries, this is not allowed for all variables associated with adverse
impact reduction (see Bollinger, 2003).
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how they reach a decision. Explicit and transparent rules to
select candidates, and collecting feedback about the quality of
selected candidates allow for evaluations and improvements
of the procedure. How can we improve decision-making in
personnel selection and college admission procedures if we
do not know exactly how candidates have been selected?
Transparent procedures allow for evaluation and improvement,
but they also make the flaws and errors of judgments and
decisions visible. That requires modesty in terms of promises
made by decision makers in practice and the acceptance of errors
from stakeholders about whom decisions are made.
Limitations of Mechanical Judgments
To apply mechanical decision-making, as Dawes and Corrigan
(1974, p. 105) discussed, “the whole trick is to decide what
variables to look at and then to know how to add.” As we
discussed above, this implies that we need valid predictors and
that these predictors should sometimes be rescaled. Although
this is certainly a surmountable obstacle, it calls for more
human effort than combining information from different
predictors in the mind, or based on an informal discussion.
Perhaps the biggest limitation in practice is that decision
makers do not like to apply mechanical decision-making
because it weakens basic human needs such as autonomy,
competence, and relatedness (Nolan and Highhouse, 2014).
Therefore, we need more studies that investigate under which
conditions practitioners do accept mechanical decision-making.
Furthermore, it is important that the performance of the
mechanical procedure remains under human supervision,
which may sometimes be difficult because as Kahneman
and Klein (2009, p. 524) discussed, “human operators




We have provided some guidelines on how mechanical rules
can be implemented, taking common practical constraints into
account, such as lack of (or small samples of) data. The methods
we proposed for combining information are fast and frugal
(Dana and Davis-Stober, 2016). For example, we combined
scores on an ability test into different categories because we
could not standardize these scores in a different way. As a
result, we lost information. Therefore, when practitioners do
have access to large databases, more sophisticated methods such
as regression analysis, relative weights analysis, or dominance
analysis are preferred over the procedures we described.
However, we hope that with this paper, we have offered
some guidelines on using mechanical judgment and decision-
making in practice.
Of course, we understand that many hurdles need to be
taken before mechanical judgment is used ubiquitously. This
paper focused on making the information on the superiority
of mechanical judgment over holistic judgment accessible for
practitioners for everyday decision-making. Next steps will
have to focus on attitude changes and increasing the ease of
mechanical decision-making in practice. A first step is having
convenient tools to place all different information on the
same score scale, and working with decision makers in a co-
production model to make mechanical judgment acceptable and
accessible for everyone.
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